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Note
That’s Not on the Table: Why Employers Should
Pay for the Walk from the Locker Room to the
Work Station
Emily E. Mawer*
Clifton Sandifer arrived at work each day and proceeded to
the locker room to put on required equipment before walking to
his assigned work station at the United States Steel Corpora1
tion’s (USS) Gary Works Plant in Gary, Indiana. The work day
equipment included a flame-retardant jacket and pants, safety
glasses, a hard hat, protective footwear and headgear, leggings,
2
and wristlets. USS did not pay Sandifer for the time it took to
don this protective gear at the beginning of the day or the time
spent doffing the clothing prior to going home, pursuant to a
3
custom established under a collective bargaining agreement.
In addition, according to a recent Seventh Circuit decision,
Sandifer’s work day still did not begin when he left the locker
4
room. Instead, USS did not begin paying Sandifer until he
5
reached his work station. However, an employee at USS’s
Great Lakes Works Plant in Ecorse and River Rouge, Michigan,
donning the same protective gear as Sandifer, walking to a location to perform the same job as Sandifer, is paid for the time

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; J.B.A.,
2010, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Thank you to Professor Stephen
Befort for his advice and guidance. Thank you also to my colleagues, the board
and staff of Minnesota Law Review, for the great work they did to publish this
Note. Most importantly, thank you to my parents, Mark and Jane, for their
endless support, love, and encouragement over the years. Copyright © 2014 by
Emily E. Mawer.
1. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 2:07-CV-443 RM, 2009 WL 3430222, at
*1–2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2009).
2. Id. at *2.
3. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2012).
4. Id. at 596.
5. Id.
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he spends walking between the locker room and the work sta6
tion.
This inconsistency arose from a recent circuit split between
7
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. The conflicting decisions concern what constitutes work time for which employers must pay
8
their employees. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) established the forty-hour work week, but did not define the term
9
“work.” The courts have since struggled to define the contours
10
of the work week. In 1944, the Supreme Court defined work
as “physical or mental exertion . . . controlled or required by the
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit
11
of the employer and his business.” These “principal activities”
12
provide the start and end point of the compensable work day.
Employers are required to pay employees for all activities between the first principal activity and the last principal activity
13
of the day. Even walking time, which is typically exempt from
14
the FLSA, is compensable during this time, as part of the con15
tinuous workday. However, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
disagree on whether an activity that is not compensable under
a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to § 203(o) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act can still be considered a principal ac6. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir. 2010). See
generally Facilities, UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, http://www.ussteel
.com/uss/portal/home/aboutus/facilities (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (identifying
the Ecorse and River Rouge plants as USS facilities).
7. See generally Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596 (holding that the walking time
is not compensable); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 620 (holding that the walking time
is compensable).
8. See generally Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596 (defining work narrowly);
Franklin, 619 F.3d at 620 (defining work expansively).
9. See Richard L. Alfred & Jessica M. Schauer, Continuous Confusion:
Defining the Workday in the Modern Economy, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
363, 364 (2011). See generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§ 203 (2012) (failing to provide a definition for the word “work”).
10. See Alfred & Schauer, supra note 9, at 363 (“A patchwork of court cases and regulatory guidance has attempted to fill this void, resulting in a variety of standards and conflicting outcomes.”).
11. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590,
598 (1944).
12. See IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005).
13. Id.
14. See Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012) (providing that employers are not liable under the FLSA for failing to pay an employee for time
spent “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed
to perform”).
15. IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 37.
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tivity. Thus, in one jurisdiction, the clothing change is a principal activity, and the subsequent walking time is paid; but in
the other jurisdiction employees must reach their work station
17
to start their compensable work day. Specifically, under one
interpretation, a collective bargaining agreement may remove
not only changing time from the paid work day, but also the
walk that follows.
Although this litigation focuses on a short period of time,
the walk from the locker room to the work station, the outcome
has broader implications. An interpretation allowing employers
to refuse to pay for the walking time supports an expansive
right to contract, favoring employers by allowing a broad range
of employee rights to be placed on the bargaining table. In contrast, holding that the walk is compensable promotes a more
narrow interpretation, preserving rights guaranteed in the
FLSA for all workers. This conflict over § 203(o) presents an
opportunity for the Supreme Court of the United States to issue
a uniform decision, both clarifying the relationship between
statutory rights and collective bargaining agreements and removing some uncertainty from the paid work day.
This Note argues for a narrow interpretation of § 203(o),
requiring employers to pay for the walk from the locker room to
the work station. Part I introduces the statutory scheme and
history of the work week and the relationship between collective bargaining agreements and the FLSA. Part II discusses
collective bargaining in America today and examines the previous attempts at determining a collective bargaining agreement’s effect on the rights conferred in the FLSA. Part III argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should resolve the circuit
split and hold that the unpaid changing time is still a principal
activity and thus the subsequent walking time is compensable.
Without a clear holding, some jurisdictions give collective bargaining agreements expansive power, beyond the language of
the statute. By restricting the negotiable statutory terms in a
union contract to a narrow interpretation of the applicable law,
the Court would preserve statutory rights for all workers—
regardless of union membership.
16. Compare Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir.
2012) (holding no), with Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir.
2010) (holding yes).
17. See Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596 (holding that an employee must reach
the work station to start the work day); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 620 (holding
that the employer must pay an employee for walking time).
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I. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: DEFINING
“WORK”
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides that an
employer cannot “employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives
18
compensation for his employment in excess of the hours . . . .”
However, the Act does not provide a definition of the word
19
“work,” leaving employers with little guidance on what activi20
ties make up their employees’ forty hours per week.
This section will review the evolution of the continuous
work day and the role of principal activities. It will then discuss
the relationship between collective bargaining and the Fair Labor Standards Act, including previous attempts to interpret
§ 203(o).
A. PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES AND THE CONTINUOUS WORKDAY
In 1944, the Supreme Court first gave context to the term
21
“work” as used in the FLSA. In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, three iron ore mining companies asked the Court to decide whether the time employees
22
spent traveling in underground mines constituted work. The
Court determined that, in the absence of legislative language to
the contrary, the term work must be interpreted as it is “commonly used—as meaning physical or mental exertion (whether
burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the em23
ployer and his business.” The Court stressed the danger involved in the miners’ travel, which included exertion as well as
“hazards to life and limb,” in concluding that the time did con24
stitute work.
The Court expanded the definition of work two years later
in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., holding that the time
employees of a pottery factory spent walking from the entrance
of the building to their work stations and the time spent don-

18. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012).
19. Id. § 203 (failing to provide a definition for the word “work”).
20. Alfred & Schauer, supra note 9, at 363.
21. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590,
597–98 (1944).
22. Id. at 591–92.
23. Id. at 598.
24. Id.
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25

ning non-protective gear was work time. The Court determined that an employee must be paid for any time she is required to be on the employer’s premises, even if that time is
26
prior to productive work. The decision caused outrage in the
business community over the extension of FLSA coverage for a
wide variety of activities that were not typically considered
27
part of the work day. In response, Congress passed the Portal28
to-Portal Act, amending employers’ liability under the FLSA.
Congress acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FLSA “creat[ed] wholly unexpected liabilities . . . upon employers with the results that, if said Act as so interpreted
or claims arising under such interpretations were permitted to
stand . . . the payment of such liabilities would bring about fi29
nancial ruin of many employers.” The Act removed time spent
traveling to and from the place of an employee’s “principal activities” from compensable time, along with activities before or
30
after those “principal activities.” Congress left the Court’s interpretation of “work” unchanged; it only created the travel
31
time exception.
The first question the Court addressed under the Portal-to32
Portal Act was the definition of a “principal activity.” In Steiner v. Mitchell, the Secretary of Labor sued a battery factory,
claiming that the time employees at the plant spent changing
into and out of work clothes and showering at the end of the
day to reduce their exposure to the toxic chemicals was com33
pensable. The employer admitted that these activities were
“indispensable to the performance of their productive work and
25. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1946).
26. Id. at 690.
27. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portalto-Portal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 62–63 (1991) (quoting the Business
Advisory Council on Attitude of Industry on Portal-to-Portal telling Congress:
“Businessmen do not believe that Congress intended to make any radical
change in the practices or customs governing the relationship between employer and employee as to when his compensation started or how much it
should be provided that the statutory minimum wage were paid . . . .”).
28. See Rachael Langston, IBP v. Alvarez: Reconciling the FLSA with the
Portal-to-Portal Act, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 545, 545–46 (2006).
29. Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012).
30. Id. § 254.
31. See id. § 251 (lacking a definition for the word “work”); Langston, supra note 28, at 546 (“Significantly, the PPA did not include a definition of
workday, but left intact the Court’s interpretation of workday as applied to the
FLSA . . . .”).
32. Alfred & Schauer, supra note 9, at 367.
33. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 248 (1956).
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integrally related thereto,” but argued that they were not
34
“principal activities.” According to the employer, activities “being performed off the production line and before or after regular
35
shift hours” did not fall under the FLSA. The Court disagreed,
holding that activities are compensable under the Portal-toPortal Act “if those activities are an integral and indispensable
part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are
36
employed.” Thus, the time spent changing clothes and showering was compensable, as those activities were an integral part
37
of the employees’ productive work in the battery factory.
The Court more recently clarified the extent of the Portal38
to-Portal Act in 2005, in the case IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez. The decision clarified the continuous workday rule, holding that any
activity after the first principal activity and before the last
principal activity of the day was excluded from the Portal-to39
Portal Act and was therefore compensable under the FLSA.
Together, Congress and the Court created a system that
functions so that an employee who is required to don protective
gear before walking to his work station and beginning his productive work, and who is not covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, must be compensated for the changing time, the
40
walking time, and the work time. In this situation, the changing time is an indispensable part of the employee’s work or
principal activities, so under Steiner it is also a principal activi41
ty. Thus, the clothing change is the first principal activity of
42
the day. The walk to the work station is subsequent to this
principal activity, but prior to the final principal activity, and is
therefore part of the continuous workday and compensable un43
der the FLSA. Finally, upon reaching the work station, the
employee begins the physical and mental exertion defined as
44
compensable work under the FLSA.

34. Id. at 251–52.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 256.
37. Id.
38. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
39. Id. at 37.
40. See id. at 40.
41. See Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256.
42. See id.
43. See IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 37.
44. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590, 598 (1944).
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B. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT
Congress passed the FLSA at a time when federal policy
45
strongly favored collective bargaining. Just three years prior
to the FLSA, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), in an effort to protect employees’ right to organize
and allow them to bargain for rights and benefits in the work46
place. Thus, the FLSA was not meant to disrupt the ability of
47
employers and unions to negotiate. When addressing Congress in debates over the FLSA, President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt stated, “We are seeking, of course, only legislation to
end starvation wages and intolerable hours; more desirable
wages are and should continue to be the product of collective
48
bargaining.”
49
The FLSA is the floor for employee rights, not the ceiling.
The Act provides a minimum standard, but allows flexibility for
unions and employers to negotiate beyond the rights afforded
50
in the Act. Employers themselves may provide, and unions
may bargain for, a higher wage, a higher overtime compensa51
tion rate, or a shorter workweek than the FLSA requires.
However, a union may not waive any employee rights provided
in the FLSA, including minimum wage, overtime requirements,
52
and what activities must be counted as work time. Further,
45. Anna Wermuth & Jeremy Glenn, It’s No Revolution: Long Standing
Legal Principles Mandate the Preemption of State Laws in Conflict with Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 839, 850 (2010).
46. See Richard Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and
Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Reconciliation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687, 688 (1997).
47. Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 45, at 850.
48. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 3,
1938), in 83 CONG. REC. 8, 9 (1938), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15517.
49. See Bales, supra note 46, at 689.
50. Id. at 689–90.
51. E.g., Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Fact Sheet #17A: Exemption for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Computer & Outside Sales
Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance//fairpay/fs17a_overview.pdf (July 2008).
52. See, e.g., Bailey v. Karolyna Co., 50 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)
(“It has been held that employees cannot bargain away their rights under the
Act or release their employers from paying the full amounts due thereunder.”);
Dep’t of Labor, Collective Bargaining Agreements, FLSA HOURS WORKED ADVISOR, http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/hoursworked/screen1c.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
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an employer is not relieved of the FLSA requirements, even if
the requirements are not affirmatively asserted by employees
53
through a collective bargaining agreement. Finally, an employer’s reliance on the terms of a collective bargaining agreement does not preclude an employee from bringing an action to
54
collect wages he or she is owed under the FLSA. The employer
is responsible for, at a minimum, complying with the terms of
the FLSA, regardless of the terms of its contract with its em55
ployees.
However, in response to the broad interpretations of the
FLSA in subsequent Court cases, Congress amended the FLSA
to provide one exception which allows employers to define some
time as outside of the work day, even though the FLSA normally requires the employer to pay his or her employees for that
56
time. According to § 203(o), if an employer, explicitly or by
custom under a collective bargaining agreement, has established that it considers time spent changing clothes or washing
at the beginning and end of the day to be outside of work time,
then this time may be exempt from the FLSA’s compensability
57
requirement.
The provision has raised the question of whether the unpaid change and wash time can still be considered a principal
58
activity. The discussion led to varying opinions amongst the
federal district courts, and ultimately to a circuit split between
59
the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
53. Bailey, 50 F. Supp. at 143 (“And if the employers cannot be relieved of
their obligations or duties under the Act by any affirmative action of their employees, they cannot be relieved by any failure on the part of any such employees to insist upon a full compliance with the Act.”).
54. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 218C(b)(2) (2006)
(“The rights and remedies in this section may not be waived by any agreement, policy, form, or condition of employment.”); Bailey, 50 F. Supp. at 143.
55. See Bailey, 50 F. Supp. at 143; Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division,
Fact Sheet #17A: Exemption for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Computer & Outside Sales Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance//fairpay/
fs17a_overview.pdf (July 2008) (“The FLSA provides minimum standards that
may be exceeded, but cannot be waived or reduced.”); Dep’t of Labor, Collective
Bargaining Agreements, FLSA HOURS WORKED ADVISOR, http://www.dol.gov/
elaws/esa/flsa/hoursworked/screen1c.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(o); Wermuth and Glenn, supra note 45, at 851–52.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o).
58. See Alfred and Schauer, supra note 9, at 369–75.
59. Compare Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that changing time is a principal activity and therefore subsequent
walking time is compensable), and Andrako v. U.S. Steel Corp., 632 F. Supp.
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C. DISPUTES OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF § 203(O)
The Department of Labor has given inconsistent guidance
on the interpretation of § 203(o). For example, in 2007, the
DOL interpreted § 203(o) as excluding changing time from an
60
employee’s principal activities. However in 2010, after a
change in presidential administrations, the DOL withdrew the
interpretation and issued new guidance allowing § 203(o)
changing time to be considered a principal activity, stating “To
hold otherwise would expand the § 203(o) exclusion well beyond
61
the language of the statute.” Then again, in July 2013, the
Agency reversed its opinion and filed an amicus brief with the
U.S. Supreme Court arguing that § 203(o) allows employers
and employees to bargain over the compensability of changing
62
time, which may affect walking time as well. The opinions
fluctuate between claiming § 203(o) is an exception to the pro63
tections of the FLSA, and thus must be interpreted narrowly,
64
and asserting that no such interpretation is necessary. Adding
to the confusion, the Agency’s interpretation of what garments
constitute “clothes” under the provision has fluctuated even
more than the Agency’s opinion on the relationship between

2d 398, 413 (2009) (holding that while the FLSA exclusion covered time taken
to don protective gear, it did not cover time spent walking to and from work
after putting on or taking off clothes), with Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678
F.3d 590, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that changing time is not a principal
activity if exempt from the FLSA under § 203(o) and therefore subsequent
walking time is not compensable), and Sisk v. Sara Lee Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d
1001, 1011 (2008) (holding that because plaintiff offered no evidence that putting on and taking off clothes were principal activities or integral or indispensable to a principal activity, plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for
those activities).
60. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Opinion Letter, FLSA2007-10
(May 14, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Opinion Letter], available at http://www.dol
.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05_14_10_FLSA.pdf.
61. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Administrator’s Interpretation
No. 2010-2, (June 16, 2010) [hereinafter Interpretation No. 2010-2], available
at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_
2.pdf.
62. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 29, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12-417 (Jan. 27, 2014) (“Petitioners do
not cite any authority for the proposition that when the FLSA leaves the compensability of certain activities to negotiation between employers and unions
on behalf of covered employees, the scope of those affected activities must be
construed narrowly against negotiation.”).
63. Interpretation No. 2010-2, supra note 61.
64. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 29, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12-417 (Jan. 27, 2014).
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65

compensability and principal activities. As a result of the inconsistent rulings, federal appellate courts, despite disagreeing
on which interpretation is correct, have agreed to largely ignore
66
the DOL’s position on the issue.
The Sixth Circuit dealt with a § 203(o) case in 2010 in a
dispute between Kellogg and an employee at the company’s
67
Rossville, Tennessee plant. Kellogg required all hourly employees to wear uniforms consisting of “pants, snap-front shirts
bearing the Kellogg logo and employee’s name, and slip68
resistant shoes . . . .” The uniform remained at the plant, so
employees changed into their uniform upon arriving at work
69
and out of their uniform before leaving for the day. Kellogg
never paid its employees for the time spent changing in the
locker room or for the time spent walking between the locker
70
room and the time clock. The collective bargaining agreement
governing the facility did not discuss the nonpayment policy,
but the policy was in place at the time the union and the em71
ployer negotiated the agreement.
An employee at the plant, Alice Franklin, brought suit on
behalf of herself and 243 current and former employees from
Kellogg facilities across the country to recover wages under the
FLSA for the time spent donning and doffing the uniform and
72
for the subsequent walking time. The court held that the custom of nonpayment for changing time was established under
65. Compare Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Division, Opinion Letter, FLSA
2002-2 (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/
2002/2002_06_06_2_FLSA.htm#.UKG1z8Vqw80 (“[W]e interpret ‘clothes’ under section 3(o) to include items worn on the body for covering, protection, or
sanitation, but not to include tools or other implements such as knives, scabbards, or meat hooks.”), with Interpretation No. 2010-2, supra note 61 (“[I]t is
the Administrator’s interpretation that the § 203(o) exemption does not extend
to protective equipment worn by employees that is required by law, by the
employer, or due to the nature of the job.”).
66. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012);
Salazar v. Butterball, LLC, 644 F.3d 1130, 1139 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Where, as
here, an agency repeatedly alters its interpretation of a statute, the persuasive
power of those interpretations is diminished.”); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619
F.3d 604, 614 (6th Cir. 2010); Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d
209, 216 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur own view rests upon the language of the
statute, not upon the gyrating agency letters on the subject.”).
67. See Franklin, 619 F.3d at 604.
68. Id. at 608.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 607–08.
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the plant’s collective bargaining agreement and therefore
§ 203(o) exempted the time spent in the locker room from the
73
FLSA. However, the court determined that “compensability
under § 203(o) is unrelated to whether an activity is a ‘principal
74
activity.’” Since Kellogg required employees to wear the uniform and the uniform primarily benefitted the company, not
the employees, the court found changing into and out of the
uniform was integral and indispensable to the employee’s
75
work. Therefore, although changing time was unpaid, the
court held it was still a principal activity, rendering subsequent
76
walking time compensable. The court noted the differing
views on the issue amongst the district courts, but was the first
federal appellate court to consider the question of whether time
spent walking to the time clock after changing clothes was
77
compensable.
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit confronted the same issue,
when 800 current and former hourly employees at the USS
plant in Gary, Indiana brought suit against the company for
failing to pay them for time spent changing clothes in the locker room and the time it took them to walk to the work station
78
from the locker room. As in Franklin, the practice of nonpayment for the changing and walking time was established under
79
a collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, § 203(o) excluded the changing time from the compensation requirements of
80
the FLSA. However, the court did not follow the same reasoning as the Sixth Circuit when it determined if the walking time
81
needed to be paid under the FLSA. Instead, the court found
that changing clothes was not a principal activity, stating, “Not
all requirements imposed on employees constitute employ82
ment.” Thus, if the union and employer had agreed that
changing time was not compensable work time, then according
to the Seventh Circuit, it was not part of the employee’s princi83
pal activities. Under this interpretation, the employees’ work
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 618.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 620
Id.
Id. at 619–20.
Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 591 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 591–92.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 597–98.
Id. at 596.
Id.
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day did not begin until they reached the work station, and thus
the walk from the locker room did not need to be paid. The
court acknowledged the contrary Sixth Circuit decision, but
called it “clearly wrong,” and argued that the “Franklin opinion
84
offers only a conclusion, not reasons.”
Together, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits created a system
where a worker must be compensated for travel time in some
states, but not in others, perpetuating the difficulty of defining
the workday for employers and employees, in addition to incon85
sistently enforcing FLSA protections.
D. SUPREME COURT WILL DEFINE “CHANGING CLOTHES” BUT
WILL NOT ADDRESS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN § 203(O) AND
COMPENSABILITY OF TRAVEL TIME
On February 19, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the
petition filed by the U.S. Steel employees for a writ of certiorari
86
to review Sandifer. However, the Court limited its review to
87
one question : “What constitutes ‘changing clothes’ within the
88
meaning of section 203(o)?” The petitioners presented the relationship between principal activities and § 203(o) as question
89
two of their petition, but the Court denied certiorari on the is90
91
sue, leaving the inquiry unanswered. Regardless of how the
Court chooses to define “changing clothes” under § 203(o), the
effect of the provision on the compensability of subsequent
walking time under the FLSA will still differ depending on the
92
jurisdiction. Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s review of the
Sandifer case, further guidance and uniformity on this issue is
needed.

84. Id. at 598.
85. See Alfred & Schauer, supra note 9, at 363.
86. Sandifer, 678 F.3d 590, cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Feb. 19,
2013) (No. 12-417).
87. Id.
88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sandifer, 678 F.3d 590 (No. 12-417).
89. Id.
90. See Sandifer, 678 F.3d 590, cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. Feb.
19, 2013) (No. 12-417).
91. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“This Court has said again and again and again that such a denial [of a
petition for certiorari] has no legal significance whatever bearing on the merits
of the claim. The denial means that this Court has refused to take the case. It
means nothing else.”).
92. See supra Part I.C.
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II. INCOMPLETE DECISIONS: HOW SECTION 203(O)
LITIGATION FAILS TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS
ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Congress passed § 203(o) in response to the Court’s expan93
sive interpretation of the FLSA, as an attempt to give power
94
back to negotiations between unions and employers. At the
time, Congress believed that collective bargaining was the best
95
mechanism for protecting American employee rights. However, the passage of time has proven that collective bargaining
agreements in many ways fail to adequately protect employ96
ees. Despite collective bargaining’s continually ineffective defense of employee rights, when the federal appellate courts are
charged with interpreting § 203(o) of the FLSA—a section ex97
plicitly discussing collective bargaining agreements —the
courts fail to consider the policy implications of either restrict98
ing or expanding the reach of collective bargaining.
This section will analyze the congressional intent behind
§ 203(o) and both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ attempts at
interpreting the provision.

93. See Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 45, at 841, 844.
94. Id. at 853–54.
95. See Bales, supra note 46, at 688.
96. See Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 169, 169 (1991) (“For many workers, the rights that
matter most come from public law and not from private collective bargaining
agreements.”); see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2685–86 (2008) (discussing the National Labor Relations Act’s failure to protect workers).
97. The FLSA provides in relevant part:
In determining . . . hours for which an employee is employed, there
shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at
the beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from
measured working time during the week involved by the express
terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collectivebargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012).
98. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618–19 (6th Cir. 2010) (failing to discuss the effect an interpretation of the relationship between compensability and principal activities has on the reach of collective bargaining
agreements); see also Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 595–98 (7th
Cir. 2012) (similarly failing to consider the limits of collective bargaining
agreements when determining if a non-compensable activity can be principal).
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A. CONGRESS PASSED § 203(O) WITH AN UNREALISTIC VISION OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Amendments to the FLSA, such as § 203(o) and the Portalto-Portal Act, represent a congressional attempt to give power
to collective bargaining agreements in the hope that employees
would successfully negotiate for their own rights through un99
ions. Although Congress wanted to provide a bare minimum
wage and maximum hours through legislation, the FLSA draft100
ers hoped for unions to negotiate beyond its provisions. In a
statement to Congress in 1938, President Roosevelt spoke of
the promise the country saw in unions, stating, “I have spoken
of labor as another essential in the three great groups of the
population in raising the Nation’s income. Definite strides in
collective bargaining have been made, and the right of labor to
101
organize has been nationally recognized.”
Over the years,
however, the era’s vision of labor relations proved inaccurate,
leading to the increased importance of legislation protecting individual rights.
In 1954, 34.7 percent of nonagricultural workers in the
102
United States belonged to unions. However, by 2013 only 11.3
percent of wage and salary workers were covered by a collective
103
bargaining agreement. Some of the most important workplace rights, such as the right to fair treatment free from discrimination, the right to health and safety in the workplace,
and the right to some economic securities, are protected by
99. See Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251(b) (2012) (“It is declared to be
the policy of the Congress . . . to protect the right of collective bargaining
. . . .”); see also Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 45, at 854 (quoting Representative Herter’s discussion of § 203(o) as an amendment to avoid broad court interpretations of employee rights that led to the Portal-to-Portal Act and stating that collective bargaining agreements have “been carefully threshed out
between the employer and the employees and apparently both are completely
satisfied with respect to their bargaining agreements”).
100. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 3,
1938), in 83 CONG. REC. 8, 9 (1938), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15517 (“[M]ore desirable wages are and should continue to be the product of collective bargaining.”).
101. Id. at 10.
102. Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an
American Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607, 616 (2004).
103. Union Members—2013, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 24, 2014),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. See generally Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership Rate Fell Again in 2011, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/business/union-membership-rate
-fell-again-in-2011.html (discussing the “decades-long slide” of union membership in the United States).
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104

statutes, not unions. The abundance of employee rights protected through legislation suggests the public has recognized
that some rights cannot be protected by collective bargaining,
105
or perhaps are too important to be left up to market forces.
Scholars point to many reasons why collective bargaining
failed to become the primary mode of securing employee rights
106
in America. Some suggest that the weaknesses of the NLRA
107
were a cause. The NLRA grants workers the right to organize, but fails to provide remedies to adequately protect the em108
ployees who choose to do so. Under the Act, an employee may
seek compensatory damages, but not punitive damages, leaving
an insufficient deterrent for employers disrupting workers’
109
rights. The Act also fails to cover a growing number of Ameri110
can employees, independent contractors, not only excluding
those workers, but also undermining the unity required for
111
covered employees working alongside contractors to unionize.
104. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 170, 175–84. See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination against employees over the age of thirty nine); Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012) (creating the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration to assure safe and healthful
working conditions for employees); Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (setting minimum standards for pension
plans); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102
(2012) (requiring employers to provide notification sixty days prior to mass
layoffs); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination against qualified employees with disabilities).
105. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 171, 192.
106. See, e.g., id. at 193 (arguing the labor movement recognized that it
needed the larger resources of the government to effectively create workers’
rights); Sachs, supra note 96, at 2694–95 (arguing the NLRA fails to adequately protect collective activity).
107. See Sachs, supra note 96, at 2694–95.
108. See id. See generally Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769–
1803 (1983) (discussing the failures of the NLRA regime).
109. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding independent contractors from the
definition of “employee”); Rick Marin, Can Manhood Survive the Recession,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.newsweek.com/can-manhood-survive
-recession-66607 (“The number of so-called independent contractors is up by
more than one million since 2005, according to Jeffrey Eisenach, an economist
at George Mason University.”).
111. See Sachs, supra note 96, at 2700 (“As the Supreme Court has observed, excluding a subset of a given workforce from the purview of labor law
makes it more difficult for all of the employees in that workforce to organize
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Other scholars point not to the NLRA, but to the practice of
112
collective bargaining itself. Collective bargaining is based in
113
part on the power of the employee to strike. However, in today’s workforce, an employer can easily replace workers or subcontract the work until the strike is over, severely weakening
114
the bargaining power of the union. In addition, worker safety
involving issues such as chemical exposure requires technical
knowledge that many employees do not have, and therefore is
better managed by a government agency like the Occupational
115
Health and Safety Administration. These areas also require
uniform enforcement across the industry, and the resources of
the government enable OSHA and other regulatory agencies to
116
ensure compliance more effectively than a union.
Unions
themselves recognized this limitation and strongly supported
117
the creation of OSHA. Finally, some employee benefits, such
118
as healthcare, affect society as a whole. Therefore, government regulation ensuring that all workers have access to such
a benefit, rather than just those protected by a specific collective bargaining agreement, is advantageous for the entire coun119
try.
Regardless of the reason for the shift from collective bargaining to a system based on public rights, it does not appear
120
that the trend will reverse itself in the near future. Today,
non-unionized employees often enjoy more workplace rights

and act collectively.”); cf. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984)
(stating that excluding undocumented employees from the NLRA would
“erod[e] the unity of all the employees and imped[e] effective collective bargaining”).
112. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 193–95.
113. Id. at 194.
114. Id. at 194–95.
115. Id. at 195. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (providing
information about OSHA).
116. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 195.
117. See James C. Miller III, Is Organized Labor Rational in Supporting
OSHA?, 50 S. ECON. J. NO. 3 881, 881 (1984); Rabin, supra note 96, at 193
(“By helping to enact this legislation, the movement recognizes that it needs
the larger resources of government to do its job.”).
118. Rabin, supra note 96, at 196.
119. Id. at 192–96.
120. Befort, supra note 102, at 632 (suggesting that “factors, such as the
global economy, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and America’s traditional antipathy for collective action, will continue to militate against any greater rebound in union strength”).
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than those protected by collective bargaining agreements.
Provisions such as § 203(o), which seek to protect the right to
negotiate, often ensure, in practice, that statutory individual
rights created for all workers do not apply to unionized employ122
ees. Thus, the hope for the future of collective bargaining that
inspired the drafters to include § 203(o) in the FLSA is misplaced in the realities of today’s workplace, where many rights
must be publicly protected, rather than bargained for.
B. SECTION 203(O) LITIGATION’S FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE
IMPLICATIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FLSA AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have contrary holdings regarding the effect of § 203(o) on the compensability of subse123
quent activities. But neither decision established a precedent
sufficient to protect employee rights in future cases. Each case
focused narrowly on the definition of a principal activity and
both failed to consider how a decision either way would affect
the power of collective bargaining to put rights protected by the
124
FLSA on the bargaining table.
The Sixth Circuit required employers to pay for the walking time, but provided no rationale, leaving a weak precedent
125
for future challenges to employee rights. The court barely analyzed the language of § 203(o), and instead simply addressed
the different positions taken by courts across the country, and

121. Bales, supra note 46, at 690.
122. Cf. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012);
Livadas v. Aubry, 943 F.2d 1140, 1150 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“It is not inconceivable that an employer could point to this discrepancy [between rights available to non-unionized employees, but not unionized
workers] as an argument against an effort to unionize . . . .”); Bales, supra note
46, at 690, 742–45 (discussing court interpretations of the Labor Management
Relations Act and the Federal Arbitration Act that “effectively withdr[ew]
from unionized employees many of the individual employment rights that
statutes or common law ostensibly confer on all employees”).
123. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2012);
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010).
124. See Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596–97 (holding that § 203(o) “permits the
parties to a collective bargaining agreement to reclassify changing time as
nonworking time,” but failing to discuss the implications of that decision on
future collective bargaining agreements); Franklin, 619 F.3d at 619 (holding
that “compensability under § 203(o) is unrelated to whether an activity is a
‘principal activity,’” but failing to provide a rationale for that decision).
125. See Franklin, 619 F.3d at 619 (concluding that compensability is unrelated to the principal activity analysis without providing any rationale).
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then announced which proposition it agreed with. The only
analysis provided by the court is that § 203(o) addresses the
compensability of changing time, not its standing as integral
127
and indispensable. The Sixth Circuit is correct, and identified
an important feature of § 203(o), but did not go any further to
128
discuss the implications of the language.
What the court
failed to recognize is that any interpretation allowing collective
bargaining agreements to determine if an activity is principal
to an employee’s work gives the contract authority to affect the
compensability of other activities, beyond the changing time
explicitly discussed in the provision. Section 203(o) represents a
congressional attempt to give some bargaining rights back to
129
unions and employers; however, any interpretation of the
provision must consider how many of the rights afforded in the
FLSA will be put on the bargaining table and how that will affect employees in future conflicts between collective bargaining
and statutes.
The Seventh Circuit likewise failed to consider the implications of its decision on the balance between collective bargaining agreements and statutes that protect American workers’
rights. Although the opinion provided more analysis than the
Sixth Circuit’s, and discussed the reach of collective bargaining
in a limited manner, it failed to consider the position of collec130
tive bargaining in society today. The court focused on the
idea that if an employee is not paid for an activity, it is not an
131
activity for which he is employed. However, like the Sixth
Circuit, the Seventh Circuit did not discuss § 203(o) as a provision striking a compromise between the right to collectively
132
bargain and the statutory rights promised by the FLSA. Instead, the court quickly decided that Congress meant to give
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Wermuth & Glenn, supra note 45, at 854.
130. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“Section 203(o) permits the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to
reclassify changing time as nonworking time . . . .”).
131. See id. at 596 (“[C]hanging time is not work time and need not be
compensated. If it is not work time—the workers aren’t being paid and their
union has agreed to their not being paid—how can it be one of the ‘principal
. . . activities which [the] employee is employed to perform’? . . . Not all requirements imposed on employees constitute employment.”) (alterations in
original) (quoting the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)
(2012)).
132. See id. at 597–98; Franklin, 619 F.3d at 615–16.
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133

full power to union negotiations, an oversimplification of the
provision that fails to consider the implications of that broad
interpretation in the realities of the modern workplace.
The DOL’s fluctuating opinion on the issue is even worse
than the weak reasoning of the Sixth Circuit and the oversimplification of the Seventh Circuit. Without ever addressing the
implications of its interpretations on the reach of collective
bargaining, the DOL gives the impression that the decision is a
134
trivial matter. The DOL’s 2007 interpretation letter simply
states that § 203(o) removed changing time from hours worked,
and therefore from principal activities, and did not inquire fur135
ther. The 2010 DOL interpretation did recognize what is at
stake with this decision, stating that the exclusion from compensability by a collective bargaining agreement does not make
136
the activity any less integral or indispensable. However, in
its 2013 amicus brief, the DOL returned to its naïve interpretation, refusing to consider the lack of success of collective bar137
gaining today.
The split over the interpretation of § 203(o) represents a
choice with implications for the future of employee rights.
When deciding if the unpaid changing time is a principal activity, the courts choose either an expansive right to contract, limiting the scope of the guaranteed employee rights provided in
the FLSA, or choose a narrow interpretation limiting the power
of collective bargaining and preserving the statutory rights afforded to American workers. Congress passed § 203(o) with a
prediction for the future of collective bargaining in American
society that did not prove true. The litigation over the compensability of this short period of time, the walk from the locker
room to the work station, presents an opportunity to issue a
138
uniform decision with precedential value for future conflicts
between statutory rights and collective bargaining agreements.

133. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 597–98.
134. See generally Interpretation No. 2010-2, supra note 61; 2007 Opinion
Letter, supra note 60.
135. 2007 Opinion Letter, supra note 60 (“Accordingly, activities covered by
section 3(o) cannot be considered principal activities and do not start the
workday. Walking time after a 3(o) activity is therefore not compensable unless it is preceded by a principal activity.”).
136. Interpretation No. 2010-2, supra note 61.
137. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 29, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12-417 (Jan. 27, 2014).
138. See, e.g., infra note 142.
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III. SECTION 203(O) PRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A
SUPREME COURT DECISION LIMITING COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING’S EFFECT ON STATUTORY RIGHTS
As the circuit split demonstrates, the text of § 203(o) lends
itself to arguments both that the Act removes changing time
from being defined as a principal activity and that it simply
removes changing time from compensability, but not classifica139
tion as a principal activity. Therefore, the textual argument
advanced by each court is insufficient to resolve the issue, and
Clifton Sandifer is still getting paid for less time than the em140
ployee performing the same duties at the plant in Michigan.
Given the ambiguous text of the provision, and the change
in the position of collective bargaining in society from the time
Congress passed § 203(o) to today, § 203(o) litigation presents
an opportunity to set a precedent for a narrow interpretation of
FLSA exemptions based on collective bargaining agreements.
Resolving the conflict over the compensability of this fairly insignificant activity, walking from the locker room to the work
station, can create a framework for understanding other future
conflicts between collective bargaining and statutory individual
rights. The Supreme Court of the United States should resolve
the circuit split and hold that when unionized employees’ statutory rights are in jeopardy, courts must restrict the negotiable
statutory terms to a narrow interpretation of the language of
the legislature, preserving as many individual statutory guarantees as possible. In this case, the FLSA explicitly allows employees to bargain away their compensation for changing and
141
washing time, but does not discuss pay for walking time.
Thus, the only activities explicitly exempt from compensable
work time are changing and washing, and the most restrictive
interpretation of the provision would not allow any other activity to be unpaid based on that agreement. Resolving the split in
this way would not only end the conflicts over walking time,
but would also provide an analysis applicable anytime a collec142
tive bargaining agreement purports to affect statutory rights.
139. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2012)
(arguing that the text of § 203(o) allows parties to “reclassify changing time as
nonworking time”); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 618 (6th Cir. 2010)
(finding that the text of “§ 203(o) only addresses the compensability of the
time, not whether it is integral and indispensable”); supra note 97.
140. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
141. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012).
142. For example, the FLSA allows employers and employees to reach a
collective bargaining agreement exempting the employer from following over
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A. RESTRICTING THE REACH OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
PROTECTS STATUTORY EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
As previously discussed, over time, collective bargaining
has proven to be an ineffective way of guaranteeing many im143
portant employee rights. When striking a balance between
statutory rights and the freedom to collectively bargain, courts
must recognize that the unequal bargaining power between the
employer and the employees affects the ability of the workers to
144
secure their own rights. Restricting negotiable legal rights to
the most limited understanding provided by the statute guarantees a minimum amount of rights for all employees, regardless of union membership.
Proponents of a more expansive interpretation of negotiable rights assert that publicly protected rights impermissibly
limit the freedom to contract. Opponents of the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion suggest that walking time compensation should also be
negotiable, as that interpretation would promote the freedom of
contract, which has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a
145
fundamental right. However, past attempts at holding the
freedom to contract above employee rights have been widely
146
criticized. Thus, although a court is free to recognize freedom
time requirements. See id. § 207(b)(1)–(2), (f). This Note’s proposed Supreme
Court holding could provide precedent for future interpretations of these sections.
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See Rabin, supra note 96, at 194–95 (discussing the workers’ ability to
effectively collectively bargain). Commentators have criticized court opinions
assuming equal bargaining power between employers and employees. Cf.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 69 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It may
be that the statute [setting maximum hours for employees in bakeries] had its
origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employees in such establishments were not upon an equal footing, and that the necessities of the latter
often compelled them to submit to such exactions as unduly taxed their
strength.”).
145. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“While this Court
has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the
term has received much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract . . . .”); Lochner, 198
U.S. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution.”).
146. David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373,
373 (2003) (stating Lochner v. New York, a 1905 Supreme Court decision overturning a worker protection law based on its infringement on the freedom to
contract, is perhaps “the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred
years”).
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to contract as an important constitutional right, it cannot do so
147
at the expense of employee rights. Instead, conflicts between
the freedom to contract and statutory rights must be viewed
with the understanding that some public interests supersede
148
the right to contract. A Supreme Court decision requiring a
narrow interpretation of exemptions to statutory exemptions is
a suitable compromise between the importance of the freedom
of contract and the necessity of publicly protected employee
rights. The decision would allow collective bargaining above the
floor provided by the legislature, without putting freedom to
contract above all else, a viewpoint which has been utterly re149
jected over time.
In addition, restricting the effect of collective bargaining
agreements on statutory rights does not suggest that collective
bargaining has no place in society at all. Proponents of collective bargaining point to limitations of individual statutory employee rights, including the failure of administrative agencies
to enforce statutes and the lack of resources for individual employees looking to sue over a violation, to argue that collective
bargaining still serves an important function in protecting em150
ployee rights. However, the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement must be closely monitored to protect employee
151
rights. Although some would argue that placing more statutory rights on the negotiating table, such as compensation for
walking time, would allow employees to more effectively negotiate, as previously discussed, relying on the power of the workers to negotiate for their own rights has created a system where
union members often have fewer rights than non-union mem152
bers. Therefore, protecting statutory rights from the bargaining table is appropriate in today’s workplace, as it preserves
those rights guaranteed to all workers, while still allowing employees and employers to negotiate for other terms. Statutes
147. Id. at 373 (“You have to reject Lochner if you want to be in the mainstream of American constitutional law today.”).
148. Id. at 375 (“It is one thing to enforce freedom of contract in a limited
and qualified way; it is quite another to make freedom of contract a preeminent constitutional value that repeatedly prevails over legislation that, in the
eyes of elected representatives, serves important social purposes.”).
149. See id. See generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–
400 (1937) (upholding a Washington minimum wage law and marking the
Court’s departure from Lochner).
150. See Bales, supra note 46, at 749–50.
151. See supra Part II.A (discussing collective bargaining’s failure to adequately protect workers’ rights).
152. Bales, supra note 46, at 690.
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like the FLSA provide a floor, and unions are welcome to bargain beyond their provisions, as long as they do not jeopardize
the statutory guarantees provided by law.
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ISSUE A DECISION PROVIDING
A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND LABOR STATUTES
Section 203(o) litigation provides an opportunity to remove
the provision from the historical view of collective bargaining
and place it in the realities of today, setting an example for future conflicts between collective bargaining and statutory
guarantees. The statute explicitly allows employees to bargain
153
away their compensation for changing and washing time, but
the provision does not explicitly require or allow employees to
154
give up their compensation for walking time. Therefore, the
Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split in favor of the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Franklin and should emphasize the
importance of restricting the reach of collective bargaining
when the agreement touches statutory rights. By holding that
§ 203(o) only affects the compensability of changing and washing time, and not its status as a principal activity, the Court
will set a precedent for restrictive interpretations of negotiable
statutory rights. Any future conflicts regarding what statutory
rights are on the bargaining table would then be resolved by
using a narrow interpretation, limiting the effect of the provision to the negotiable rights explicitly named by the statute,
thus guaranteeing employee rights for all workers, unionized or
not.
CONCLUSION
Since Congress passed § 203(o), collective bargaining has
proved to be an ineffective protection for many basic employee
155
rights. Today, non-unionized workers have more rights than
156
many unionized workers. The disparity represents the need
for judicial decisions narrowly interpreting the statutory employee rights that may be put on the bargaining table in a contract between an employer and a union. The debate over the
153. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2012).
154. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010) (“We
agree with the courts that have taken the position that compensability under
§ 203(o) is unrelated to whether an activity is a ‘principal activity.’”).
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. Bales, supra note 46, at 690.
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meaning of § 203(o) presents an opportunity for the U.S. Supreme Court to issue a decision creating a precedent for interpretations that limit the reach of collective bargaining agreements to only the authority explicitly given to them by
Congress, thus protecting statutory rights guaranteed to all
employees, regardless of union membership. Clifton Sandifer’s
walk to the locker room may be short in time, but requiring his
employer to pay him for those few minutes would bring long
lasting effects to statutory employee rights.

